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ARGUMENT
A. Setting aside default and denial of motion for default judgment.
Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation dba St. Mark's Hospital ("St.
Mark's") was served in May 2007 with a Notice of Intention to Commence
an Action by Roth. [R336] St. Mark's through its attorneys stipulated that a
proceeding before the Department of Occupational and Professional
Licensing ("DOPL") would serve no purpose [R68] which provided for a
certificate of compliance to be issued by DOPL so that Roth could file his
lawsuit. [R336] On March 31, 2008 St. Mark's attorneys received the
Summons and Complaint dated January 17, 2008. [R68] (Emphasis
added) The Summons on its face stated that an answer was due within 30
days of service. [R28]. The only reason given for the failure to file an
answer to the Summons and Complaint was a non-attorney in the attorneys
office incorrectly calendared the due date at 45 days. [R68 and 76-77].
There is no dispute that St. Mark's did not file a timely answer. [See page 6
of St. Mark's Brief acknowledging the due date to answer as April 24, 2008
and they did not file until May 9, 2008].
St. Mark's opens its Argument at page 19 of its Appellee Brief
arguing that a trial court is endowed considerable discretion in granting

or denying motions to set aside a default. Roth agrees. St. Mark's cites
some cases, mainly federal cases that make relief from a default easier to
obtain than relief from a default judgment and argues that it would be an
abuse of the court in not granting relief in a case like the one before this
Court based upon this less stringent requirement for granting relief.
However, this is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court decision cited in
Roth's Brief at pg 22, concluding that Rule 60(b) criteria are applicable to
demonstrate "good cause" under Rule 55(c), See Gold Standard. Inc. v.
American Barrick Resources Corp.. 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) and does
not square with a recent decision of this Court. In Davis v. Goldsworthv.
184 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) in a case involving a default, like St.
Mark's claim in this case, Goldsworthy's theory was essentially one of
excusable neglect. This Court in Davis v. Goldsworthv. at 630 id. "To
demonstrate that the default was due to excusable neglect, '[t]he movant
must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.'" Citing Black's
Title. Inc.. 1999 UT App. 330, |10, 991 P.2d 607 (quoting Airkem
Intermountain. Inc. v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). "Absent such a
showing, [a defaulting party['s assertion does not demonstrate his neglect
was excusable." Id.
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All that the Trial Court had to go on was that the answer was not filed
by the deadline and that the only excuse was that a non-attorney staff
member for HPS calendared the response date at 45 instead of the required
30 days. There was absolutely no requisite showing of due diligence after
the attorneys received the summons and complaint and no showing or even
suggestion of any kind that HPS was prevented from appearing by
circumstances over which they had no control.
This Court should follow its own precedence as it declared under
similar circumstances in Davis v. Goldsworthy, at 630, id. "reverse and
remand to the trial court for the detailed findings required by Utah case law
and for such orders as may then be appropriate."
B. Discovery of legal injury through due diligence.
Dr. Joseph appears to argue that the burden is on Roth to overcome
the trial court's determination that he discovered his legal injury on October
13, 2004 or at least by January 5, 2005. However, this burden is and has
been Dr. Joseph's to establish. See Conder v. Hunt. 2000 UT App 105,114,
1 P.3d 558, cert denied, 9 P.3d 170 (Utah 2000). 114 "As with any
affirmative defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element
necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [plaintiffs] claim."
Seale v. Gowans. 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996). See Stewart v. K & S
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Co., 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Slavden v. Sixta. 250 Kan. 23, 825
P.2d 119, 122 (1992) (stating "the burden of pleading and proving" statute of
limitation's applicability "rests on the defendant").
Dr. Joseph argues that since Roth obtained his medical records on
January 5, 2005 the statute of limitations was triggered by at least this date if
not the earlier date of October 13, 2004 when Roth admittedly learned of his
physical injury. It appears from Dr. Joseph's argument that he is claiming
that Roth learned of his legal injury on October 13, 2004 when he discovered that the polypectomy site was not removed during surgery.
However, all this establishes is that Roth learned of his physical injury, but
in no way equates to his discovery of his legal injury. The statute of limitations that Dr. Joseph is seeking to invoke is U.C.A. §78B-3-404(l). It
provides ".. .malpractice action... shall be commenced within two years
after...patient discovers,.. .the injury..." "Injury" (legal injury) is defined as
discovery of injury and the negligence that caused the injury. Foil v.
Ballinger. 601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979). As for obtaining medical records on January 5, 2005, it is an incredulous claim that this established the
day Roth knew of his legal injury. This would be like handing someone
who does not know Arabic the Quran written in Arabic and then claiming
that as of that date they were aware of the teachings of Muhammad.
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The law in Utah is clear that in order to invoke the statute of limitations in this case, short of Dr. Joseph delineating some definitive event or
date that clearly demonstrates Roth learned of his legal injury, it is for the
jury to conclude when this occurred or should have occurred through due diligence. The Utah Supreme Court in a recent case, Daniels v. Gamma West
Brachvtherapv. 2009 UT 66, p i , 221 P.3d 256 (2009) declared,
Tying the statute of limitations' trigger to the discovery
of the cause-in-fact of a patient's injury does not leave
health care professionals endlessly susceptible to revived
claims. Instead, the discovery rule is tempered by a
requirement that a patient act with reasonable diligence in
investigating a suspected injury. Thus, the statute of
limitations begins when exercising such diligence a patient
should have discovered his injury and its possible negligent
cause. Whether and when a patient should have discovered
an injury and its cause is a fact intensive question that
requires a jury to determine, given the information available,
whether the actions taken in response to an injury and the
efforts extended to discover its cause were adequate.
The one record in these voluminous medical records that Dr. Joseph is
"hanging his hat on" is an obscure office note of Dr. Voorhees in June 2004.
By itself it does not really shed light on any determination that a negligent
act occurred. At best it may lead one to further inquiry as to its meaning.
That is exactly what Roth proceeded to do. He made inquiry through the
depositions of Dr. Joseph and Dr. Voorhees in January 2007 as to the
meaning of problems involving the tattoo ink.
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In this case it is for the jury to determine when Roth through due diligence should have discovered his legal injury. As we learned from the
Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, case at | 3 1 , in order for the jury to
make this determination they also need to know ".. ..which event it is evaluating for whether the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware of what
was the negligent cause of his injury." Roth on Octpber 13, 2004 was led
by Dr. Joseph to believe that the surgeon was responsible [R236 ^[19] causing Roth to concentrate on this causal event, the May 24, 2004 surgery, and
not look at Dr. Joseph's April 28, 2004 treatment.
C. Discovery of Legal injury - Issue Preclusion
Dr. Joseph argues issue preclusion based upon Judge Lindberg's
ruling in the Roth v. Pedersen, 2009 UT App. 313 (unpublished) (attached
hereto in the Appendix). The trial court dismissed this case based upon its
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and
therefore his filing his statutory notice to commence an action and suit in
2008 was more than two years from this date and therefore the statute of
limitations had run. This Court affirmed the dismissal; however, upon
different grounds than applied by the Trial Court. This Court rejected the
determination that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004 and
instead determined that by at least the time he initiated a malpractice action
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against the surgeon he had discovered his legal injury, some nineteen
months later. See Roth v. Pedersen. pg 3 of this Court's unpublished
Memorandum Decision (Appendix). In order to use issue preclusion to
establish that Roth discovered his legal injury on October 13, 2004, such
prior position must have been successful, and in the prior case it was not.
See 3D Constr. & Dev.. L.L.C. v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co.. 2005 UT App
307,111, 117 P.3d 1082, 1085-86 "Under judicial estoppel, fa person may
not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior
judicial proceeding between the same persons or their privies involving the
same subject matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained.'"
Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n. 2001 UT 74,126, 34 P.3d 180 (quoting
Tracv Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co.. 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388,
390(1942)).
Furthermore, Dr. Joseph in his Brief at page 28 sets forth the criteria
that must be met before issue preclusion is applied, citing Oman v. Davis
School District 2008 UT 70,129, 194 P.3d 956.
(i) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been
a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
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Roth is the party in both suits for which Dr. Joseph seeks issue
preclusion, so element (i) is met and the memorandum decision in the prior
appeal "resulted in a final judgment on the merits." See State v. Baker. 176
P.3d 493, 496 (Utah App. 2008); thus, element (ii) is met. The litigation
however, was never completely and fully litigated in that there was no
hearings conducted, there was no evidence provided to the Court, and in this
jury case no jury was impaneled. Thus element (iii) was not met and as for
element (ii) the issue decided is not identical to the issue in the matter at
hand. Dr. Pedersen was sued for alleged malpractice that occurred in a
surgical procedure on May 24, 2004; whereas, Dr. Joseph is being sued for
medical malpractice related to his treatment in a separate causal event in
April 2004.
Not withstanding the foregoing argument, the final decision on the
merits in Roth v. Pedersen. pg. 3, id, concluded that Roth discovered his
legal injury by May 2006 and as such the statute of limitations in this case
would have similarly run in May 2008, some four months after Roth filed
suit against Dr. Joseph and St. Mark's.
D. Concealment
Where the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph plays a
significant role in this case is that it represents information that Dr. Joseph
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had a duty to disclose to Roth after receipt of the letter from Dr. Voorhees.
Dr. Joseph was absolutely required to inform Roth that he was experiencing
problems with the SPOT ink used to tattoo Roth's polypectomy site and that
it was likely Dr. Voorhees failed to remove this cancerous site in the May
24, 2004 surgery, which information was critical for Roth in determining
how to proceed in protecting his body. A doctor does have a common law
fiduciary duty "to disclose to his patient any material information
concerning the patient's physical condition." Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d
348, 354 (Utah 1980). See Daniels, 2009 UT 66. | 5 1 . The question of what
is "material information" is for the jury.

Nixdorf v. Hicken at 354, id.

Roth testified in his affidavit herein, that the first he became aware of
the June 8, 2004 letter from Dr. Voorhees to Dr. Joseph was during the
deposition of Dr. Joseph in 2007. The fact this letter was not in Dr. Joseph's
medical records certainly raises a question for the jury as to why Dr. Joseph
concealed this letter from Roth. This certainly raises a material issue of fact.
Dr. Joseph argues that Roth's argument of fraudulent concealment is
baseless and Roth was required to prove that Dr. Joseph affirmatively acted
to conceal. The law is clear in Utah that a doctor has a duty to disclose to
his patient material medical information. Nixdorf v. Hicken. at 354 id
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The Court in Charlesworth v. Revns. 113 P.3d 1031, 1037 (UTApp. 2005)
stated, "A fiduciary's breach of the 'duty to speak the truth' is sufficient to
establish fraudulent concealment. Russell/Packard Dev.. Inc. v. Carsoa 78
P.3d 616, affdas to result, 108 P.3d 741, 752 (quoting Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hosp.. 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989)),
Dr. Joseph states that where fraudulent concealment is alleged the
circumstances forming the basis of the allegation must be stated with
particularity. Roth has stated acts of fraudulent concealment with
particularity. Roth pointed to Dr. Joseph's knowledge of the problems the
surgeon experienced in the botched surgery, that it related to his failure to
properly tattoo the polypectomy site, his failure to disclose his
miscommunication to the surgeon as to the location of the polypectomy site
and his failure to disclose to Roth that the surgeon asked Dr. Joseph to
promptly perform a colonoscopy in order to determine if the polypectomy
site had been removed as he was concerned that it might not have been.
[Rl-8]. Dr. Joseph much like the defendant Dr. Veasy in Chapman v.
Primary Children's Hospital 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989), misdirected Roth
away from looking at him for malpractice [R236 ^[19] and although aware
of critical medical information that he was required and had a duty to
disclose to Roth, he remained silent (concealment). "In this case, however,
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the Chapmansf complaint, though drafted in an admittedly 'scattershot'
fashion, contains the averments that defendants withheld information
regarding the cause of Jennifer's injuries and 'misinformed [the Chapmans]
by, among other things, advising them that the brain damage sustained by
Jennifer Chapman was an unavoidable event which was not caused by any
misconduct on the part of any of the defendants.' This is a sufficiently clear
and specific description of the facts underlying the Chapmans' claim of
fraudulent concealment to support our conclusion that the requirement of
rule 9(b) has been met. See Peteler v. Robison. 81 Utah 535, 553, 17 P.2d
244, 250 (1932)." Roth respectfully submits that he has as well made
sufficiently clear and specific description of the facts underlying his claim of
fraudulent concealment to support a conclusion that the requirement of Rule
9(b) has been met.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court did not make the requisite findings to support St.
Mark's request for relief for excusable neglect, specifically no findings were
made and interestingly nothing was provided by St. Mark's showing due
diligence and that it was prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which it had no control. This Court should reverse the Trial Court's setting
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aside the Default Certificate and remand for the detailed findings required by
Utah case law and for such orders as may then be appropriate.
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as genuine
issues of material fact exist as to when Roth discovered or through due
diligence should have discovered his legal injury. Specifically there is
actually no date provided in the Record that establishes Roth's discovery of
both the causal event and the negligence which caused his physical injury.
As to when he should have through due diligence discovered the causal
event and the negligence is a fact intensive matter for the jury to determine.
The Order granting Summary Judgment must be reversed as a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether Roth was prevented from discovering
his legal injury because of the alleged fraudulent concealment of Dr. Joseph.
Issue preclusion is inapplicable in this case and does not support the
summary judgment entered herein.
For these reasons, this Court should reverse and remand on the
granting of Rule 60(b) relief to St. Mark's and allow the Trial Court to make
such findings under Utah law as to whether or not St. Mark's can
demonstrate that their failure to timely file an answer to the Complaint was
due to excusable neglect. This Court should reverse the Summary Judgment
entered in favor of the defendants and allow a jury to decide when Roth
discovered the causal event and negligence that caused his injury and/or
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determine whether there was fraudulent concealment in order for the Trial
Court to then be able to determine whether the statute of limitations ran or
had not run in this case.
DATED this 24th day of March 2010.

David E. Ross II
Attorney for Appellant
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Roth v. Pedersen. 2009 UT App. 313.
Entered October 29, 2009, as an unpublished Memorandum Decision
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Larry Roth,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
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F T T F D
(October 29, 2009)
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The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
Attorneys:

David E. Ross II, Park City, for Appellant
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Orme, and McHugh.
McHUGH, Judge:
Larry Roth appeals the trial court's grant of Dr. Peder J.
Pedersen's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed
with prejudice Roth's medical malpractice claim against Pedersen.
We affirm.
Whether a motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly
granted is a question of law, which we review for correctness.
See MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 432, % 2, 147
P.3d 536. "When reviewing a grant of [such] a motion . . . ,
this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as
true; we then consider such allegations and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs." Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. Department of
Transp., 2004 UT App 405, \ 7, 103 P.3d 716 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, "[tjhe applicability of a statute of
limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are
[also] questions of law, which we review for correctness."
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, \ 18, 108 P.3d
741 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Roth argues that the trial court improperly considered
materials outside the pleadings to conclude that the two-year
statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice claim

ajainst Pedersen had expired. Specifically, he claims the trial
court considered Pedersen's memorandum supporting his motion for
judgment to extrapolate the date upon which Roth first became
aware of his legal injury. In reviewing a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, a trial court may only consider the pleadings.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c); see also id. R. 7(a) (listing the
following pleadings: complaint, answer, reply to a counterclaim,
answer to a cross-claim, third party complaint, and third party
answer). "'If a court does not exclude material outside the
pleadings and fails to convert a rule 12 [ (c)] motion to one for
summary judgment, it is reversible error unless the dismissal can
be justified without considering the outside documents.'" Tuttle
v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, K 6, 155 P.3d 893 (quoting Oakwood
Vill., LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, % 12, 104 P.3d
1226) .1 Although we agree that the trial court relied upon
material outside of the pleadings in "finding" that Roth became
aware of the legal injury on October 13, 2004, we nevertheless
uphold the order granting the motion because "'the dismissal can
be justified without considering the outside document [],'" see
id.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the Act) requires an
action to be commenced within two years "after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs." Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l) (2008).
The Utah Supreme Court has
"repeatedly interpreted the phrase 'discovered the injury' as
meaning discovering the 'injury and the negligence which resulted
in the injury,' also referred to as 'legal injury.'" Daniels v.
Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, f 25, 640 Utah Adv. Rep.
8 (quoting Foil v. Ballincrer, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979)); see
also Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337, 1338-39 (Utah 1987) ("[T]he
plaintiff must know of the injury and of the negligence which
caused the injury."); Foil, 601 P.2d at 148 ("[T]he two-year
1. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 155 P.3d 893, addresses the
same question in the context of a motion to dismiss under rule
12(b) (6). See id. f 7. However, because "[t]he Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure contain identical provisions for converting
motions under rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) into motions for summary
judgment," id. f 7 n.l, the same standard of review applies for a
12(c) motion as for one under 12(b)(6).
2. For the convenience of the reader, we reference the 2008
codification of section 78B-3-404 because the renumbered statute
contains language identical to the version in effect when Roth's
cause of action arose. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404 amendment
notes (2008) (noting that statute had been renumbered and
reorganized but no substantive changes were made).
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provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew
or should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the
injury was caused by negligent action.").
In his complaint, Roth avers that he underwent resection
surgery in May 2004 to remove a cancerous section of his colon.
The affected area had been marked by tattoos to assist with the
resection. Roth further alleges that six months after the
resection surgery, the doctor who had first identified the
cancerous polyps, and the doctors who performed a second
colonoscopy saw the original tattoo markings, indicating that the
wrong area of Roth's colon had been removed during the May 2 0 04
resection surgery. Roth also asserts that he had a second
surgery to remove the correct site. The answer states that the
date of that surgery was January 24, 2005.1
It is clear from the pleadings that Roth was aware that a
legal injury had occurred at least by the time he initiated legal
action against the general surgeon in May 2006. Thus, Roth knew
both that he had suffered a legal injury and that it had happened
during the resection surgery. That awareness triggered the
statute of limitations regardless of whether Roth knew the
precise identity of the wrongdoer. See McDougal v. Weed, 945
P.2d 175, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting the Act to start
the statute of limitations once a plaintiff or patient discovers
that an injury has occurred and that injury was likely the result
of negligence, not upon the establishment of the identity of the
person responsible); see also Daniels, 2009 UT 66, % 28 ("Under
McDougal \ v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)], a
plaintiff need not know the identity of the responsible
tortfeasor, but must know which medical event allegedly caused
his injury.").
Nevertheless, Roth neglected to file his complaint against
Pedersen until August 2008, some three months after the statute
of limitations had expired.3 Accordingly, we conclude that the
grant of the motion for judgment and subsequent dismissal were
appropriate because Roth failed, as required by the Act, to
commence litigation within two years of discovery of his legal
injury, which occurred, at the very latest, in May 2006. See
3. Roth did serve a notice of intent to commence legal action on
Pedersen on January 12, 2008. However, where the notice is
served more than ninety days prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations, the action must actually be commenced
within the two-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-3-412(4) (extending the statute of limitations only where
notice is filed within the statute of limitations but less than
ninety days prior to its expiration).

20090139-CA
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generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(l) (prescribing the statute
of limitations for malpractice actions).
Roth alternately contends that the trial court erred in
concluding that the statute of limitations had expired pursuant
to subsection (1) of Utah Code section 78E-3-404 (1), see id.
§ 786-3-404(1), because he alleged fraudulent concealment, which
is governed by subsection (2)(b) of that section, see id. § 78B3-404(2) (b) . Subsection (2) (b) provides,
[W]here it is alleged that a patient has been
prevented from discovering misconduct on the
part of a health care provider because that
health care provider has affirmatively acted
to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered
the fraudulent concealment, whichever first
occurs.
Id. Pedersen counters that Roth's fraudulent concealment claim
must fail because Roth did not state his claim with particularity
as required by rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
see Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating that in allegations of fraud,
the "circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with
particularity"); see also Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp.,
784 P.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Utah 1989) (requiring a plaintiff
pleading fraudulent concealment under the Act to comply with rule
9(b)'s particularity requirements). Pedersen correctly concedes
that "[a] fraud allegation made on information and belief is
adequate under rule 9(b), 'as long as it includes the facts upon
which the belief is based.'" Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App
85, % 24, 69 P.3d 286 (quoting Arena Land & Inv. Co. v. Petty,
906 F. Supp 1470, 1476 (D. Utah 1994)). However, "mere
conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation
of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to preclude
dismissal or summary judgment." Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186.
Pedersen asserts that Roth's fraudulent concealment claim
consists of a single unsupported conclusory allegation. In this
allegation, Roth claims that he obtained information in August
2 0 07, from which
it appears that Dr. Pedersen concealed the
fact that he failed to properly consult with
[the general surgeon] in May 2004 as to the
reasons the tattooing may not have been
identified, the reasons the polypectomy site
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could not be seen[,] and [to inform him that]
the area requiring surgery remained
[unremoved].
Roth argues that he incorporated by reference other factual
statements made earlier in the complaint to support his
allegation of fraudulent concealment. These factual averments
suggest that Pedersen both knew about the problems with ink
fading, the discrepancy between the doctors regarding the
tattoos' locations, and the reasons why the polypectomy site may
not be visible, and neglected to convey that knowledge to the
general surgeon. Roth claims that this failure to speak was a
breach of the fiduciary duty owed by Pedersen as Roth's
physician. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333
(Utah 1997) ("Fraudulent concealment requires that one with a
legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts remain
silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts."); Nixdorf v.
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980) (noting that doctors have a
fiduciary duty to their patients to disclose "any material
information concerning the patient's physical condition"); see
also Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapv, LLC, 2009 UT 66, Iff 5051, 640 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (reaffirming physician's fiduciary
obligation to keep patient apprised of his physical condition
post-treatment).
Even assuming that a fiduciary duty to reveal this
information existed because of Pedersen's medical partnership
with Roth's original doctor and his provision of medical care to
Roth, Roth fails to allege that Pedersen "affirmatively acted to
fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct" from Roth, see Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(2) (b) (2008). Indeed, Roth neither avers
that he ever consulted with Pedersen about the May 2 004 resection
surgery nor alleges that Pedersen ever provided Roth with
information that misrepresented or concealed his involvement in
the surgery. He also does not claim that due to Pedersen's
failure to disclose, the general surgeon misrepresented the
problems that arose during surgery or the outcome.4 Furthermore,
nowhere in the complaint does Roth allege that he was precluded
from further discussing the surgery with or deposing the general
surgeon from whose August 2 007 testimony he learned of Pedersen's
lack of disclosure.5 Without such factual allegations, Roth's
4. In fact, the answer states that the general surgeon informed
Roth that neither he nor Pedersen could see the tattoos but that
the general surgeon believed he had removed the correct portion
of Roth's colon.
5.

The general surgeon testified that in June 2004, he discussed
(continued...)
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fraudulent concealment claim is nothing more than a mere
conclusory allegation that is insufficient to preclude dismissal.
See Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186 (permitting dismissal where
conclusory allegations were not supported by facts).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of this claim
for failure to plead fraud with sufficient particularity.
Because the two-year statute of limitations for filing a
medical malpractice claim expired at the latest in May 2008, the
trial court properly dismissed Roth's August 2 008 complaint on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Additionally, Roth failed
to plead fraudulent concealment with particularity as required by
rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we
affirm the dismissal with prejudice.

WE CONCUR:

5. (...continued)
with Roth's original doctor the lack of disclosure from
Pedersen's office regarding the ink fading problems.

20090139-CA

6

